Understanding buy in for risky prospects: Incorporating degree of belief into the ex ante assessment of support for alternative road pricing schemes by Hensher, David A. et al.
  
 
 
INSTITUTE of TRANSPORT and 
LOGISTICS STUDIES 
The Australian Key Centre in 
Transport and Logistics Management 
 
The University of Sydney 
Established under the Australian Research Council’s Key Centre Program. 
 
 
WORKING PAPER 
ITLS-WP-12-19 
Understanding buy in for risky 
prospects: Incorporating degree of 
belief into the ex ante assessment 
of support for alternative road 
pricing schemes. 
 
By 
 
 
David A. Hensher, John M. Rose and 
Andrew T. Collins 
 
 
October 2012 
 
ISSN 1832-570X 
 
NUMBER: Working Paper ITLS-WP-12-19 
 
TITLE: Crowding in public transport:  A review of objective and 
subjective measures. 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper investigates support for road pricing reform within 
the framework of a referendum voting choice model.  Central to 
this task is how to identify ex ante support for specific road 
pricing schemes, such that the evidence is believable. Our 
approach is centred on a referendum voting choice model for 
alternative road pricing schemes in which we incorporate 
information that accounts for the degree of belief of the extent to 
which such schemes will make voters better or worse off. We 
find that accounting for belief in the benefits results in sizeable 
reductions in the sensitivity to the levels of the charge but quite 
small impacts on the sensitivity to revenue allocation. 
 
KEY WORDS: Road pricing reform, voting choice, referendum, subjective 
belief, perceptual conditioning, revenue allocation, elasticities, 
choice experiment. 
 
AUTHORS: Hensher, Rose and Collins  
Acknowledgements This study is supported by the Australian Research Council 
Discovery Program Grant DP110100454 titled “Assessment of 
the commuter's willingness to pay a congestion charge under 
alternative pricing regimes and revenue disbursement plans”. We 
are indebted to Jun Zhang for his programming of the survey 
instrument.  
 
CONTACT: INSTITUTE of TRANSPORT and LOGISTICS STUDIES (C37) 
The Australian Key Centre in Transport and Logistics Management 
 
The University of Sydney   NSW   2006   Australia 
 
Telephone: +612  9351 0071 
Facsimile:  +612  9351 0088 
E-mail: business.itlsinfo@sydney.edu.au 
Internet: http://sydney.edu.au/business/itls 
 
 
DATE: October 2012 
 
Understanding buy in for risky prospects:  Incorporating degree of belief into the  ex anti assessment of 
support for alternative road pricing schemes 
Hensher, Rose and Collins 
 
1 
1. Introduction 
Roads are possibly the most underpriced of all the public assets in terms of efficient user 
contributions. Regardless of whether some believe that governments should provide more road 
capacity to combat traffic congestion, it is an undeniable fact that if we provide more capacity under 
the existing road user pricing regimes and levels, more cars will use the roads, quickly using up the 
additional capacity. The great sadness about all of this is that there is a presumption that we all have 
rights to enter the traffic and delay all other motorists, yet not contribute to the true cost associated 
with delay and lost time – the 'tragedy of the commons'. The future of public transport is also linked to 
this tragedy of the commons, if one believes in the adage that ‘to make public transport more 
attractive we have to make the car less attractive’. 
This paper develops a way of investigating community support for road pricing reform within the 
framework of referendum voting.  The challenge that many jurisdictions face is persuading politicians 
and their advisers of the merits of road pricing reform. Central to this task is how to identify, in a 
convincing way, ex ante support for specific road pricing schemes (defined in terms of a charge, a 
regime and a revenue allocation plan), such that the evidence is believable. Our approach incorporates 
information that accounts for the degree of perceptually conditioned subjective belief of voters with 
the alternative schemes making them better or worse off. Understanding degrees of belief in perceived 
benefit will provide critical guidance on ex post support for a particular scheme when implemented, 
and hence can be used to identify the likely support both ex ante and ex post for specific road pricing 
schemes and promotional campaigns, in order to reduce the ambiguity and uncertainty of outcomes 
that impact individual voters and the community as a whole. 
There is a burgeoning theoretical and empirical interest in how to get buy in ex ante for proposed road 
pricing schemes in cities exposed to growing levels of traffic congestion. We have reviewed this 
literature in Hensher and Li (2012). Two recent studies are examples where a specific emphasis is 
placed on the important role of revenue allocation in gaining support. Marcucci et al. (2005) use a 
citizen-candidate framework with a population composed of three groups differing in their income 
level and show that road pricing policies are never applied when there is no redistribution of the 
resources in favour of other modes of transport or when the congestion of these types of transport is 
relatively high. The results suggest that the efficiency of the redistribution of resources from road to 
the alternative types of transport as well as the fraction of the population that uses the road transport 
are key factors in explaining the adoption of road pricing schemes.  
De Borger and Proost (2012) use a simple majority voting model and show that individual uncertainty 
with respect to modal substitution costs may imply that a majority votes against road pricing ex ante, 
although a majority would have been in favour after its introduction ex post. Moreover, if a majority is 
against road pricing ex ante, there will also be no majority for organising an experiment that would 
take away the individual uncertainty. Their model also suggests that political uncertainty with respect 
to the use of the revenues corroborates the finding that ex ante more voters will be against the 
introduction of tolls. Both types of uncertainty suggest that fewer voters are against road pricing when 
toll revenues are used to subsidize public transport than when they are redistributed to all voters. 
These results are consistent with recent empirical observations (see Eliasson et al. 2009, Hensher and 
Puckett 2005, 2007) on efforts to introduce road pricing, including the systematic rejection of road 
pricing in referenda, the more favourable attitudes towards road pricing after than before its 
introduction, and tying the revenues to support public transport. 
The next section introduces the approach we have used to incorporate degrees of belief associated 
with making choices in general as well as in the context of a choice experiment. We embed the degree 
of belief into a non-linear utility expression associated with the alternative charging regimes and 
revenue allocation propositions as a mixed logit choice model. We then discuss data needs and the 
design of a survey instrument that captures all the required empirical information and present voting 
choice models to identify the elasticities of interest in the presence and absence of accounting for 
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perceptually conditioned subjective beliefs on scheme benefits. The paper concludes with suggestions 
for ongoing research. 
2. Degrees of belief and road pricing schemes 
This paper focuses on the voting (in a referendum) implications associated with recognising degrees 
of belief when assessing buy in via a voting choice model to alternative road pricing schemes. In the 
current setting of road pricing reform, degrees of belief underlie decision weights that provide 
perceptual conditioning of subjective probability judgments associated with the extent to which each 
proposed road pricing scheme is perceived by a respondent as making them better or worse off. This 
evidence, derived directly as a numerical probability judgment, plays an important role in 
conditioning the marginal (dis)utility attached to the elements of a road pricing scheme (namely, the 
regime, the charge level, and revenue allocation). Such conditioning is aimed at increasing, ex ante, 
the external validity of voting preferences in a referendum context. 
We can obtain a numerical subjective probability belief judgment through direct questioning of 
individuals. For example, in terms of a proposed road pricing scheme: 
 
“Suppose that the government were to introduce a distance-based car use charge of X 
c/km at congested (peak) periods and Y c/km at un-congested (off-peak) periods 
throughout Sydney {or in the Sydney Central Business District} together with a reduction 
in fuel excise of Tc/litre and a reduction in annual car registration charge of $W per 
annum1
 
. Suppose also that revenue raised from a new road user charging scheme will be 
spent as follows - X% to improve public transport, Y% to improve existing and construct 
new roads, and W% to reducing income tax, instead of being put into the government’s 
general revenue pool and spent as they desire (and to compensate private tollroad 
companies for the revenue loss from removal of tolls). 
To what extent do you think that each of these schemes will make you better (or worse) 
off? (0=not at all, 100=definitely).   
 
This measure can be used to obtain probabilistic belief weights, denoted by P(Z), where Z is a 
subjective belief response scale (0-100) associated with the road pricing scheme attributes in the 
utility expression for each alternative. It is well recognised in the psychology literature (see Tversky 
and Kahneman 1992) that degrees of belief are implicit in most decisions whose outcomes depend on 
uncertain events. In quantitative theories of decision making such as subjective expected utility theory 
or prospect theory, degrees of belief are related to decision weights and are typically identified by 
either prescribed levels as part of alternatives in a choice experiment or in a more direct manner using 
a linguistic device such as judgments of numerical probability. Such estimates are often viewed as an 
approximation to the degrees of belief implicit in decisions or preference revelation (see Fox 1999). It 
is well recognised that numerical probability judgments are often based on heuristics that produce 
biases. One of the methods proposed to accommodate some aspects of such potential bias was the idea 
of a decision weight (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) which accounts for the presence of perceptual 
conditioning in the way that information reported by decision makers or information offered to 
decision makers is heuristically processed. Specifically, the value of an outcome is weighted not by its 
probability but instead by a decision (or belief) weight, w (·), that represents the impact of the relevant 
probability on the valuation of the prospect. w(.) need not be interpreted as a measure of subjective 
belief – a person may believe that the probability of a road pricing scheme making them better off is, 
for example 0.5, but afford this event a weight of more or less than 0.5 in the evaluation of a prospect.  
                                                          
1 This can include the current fuel excise level.  
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A number of functional forms have been used in the literature to capture the extent of deviation 
between an obtained belief probability and a perceptually conditioned belief probability. We have 
chosen the popular form in (1), where ( )w p  is the probability belief weight function; mp is the 
subjective belief probability associated with the specific road pricing scheme; and γ is the probability 
weighting parameter to be estimated which measures the degree of curvature of the belief weighting 
function. Equation (1) is an inverse S-shaped single-parameter weighting function with over-
weighting of low belief probabilities, and under-weighting of medium to high belief probabilities for 
values of 0<γ<1. This is the form originally proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), which has 
been widely used in psychology and behavioural economics. 
1( )
[ (1 ) ]
o
o
o o
pw p
p p
=
+ −
γ
γ γ γ
 
(1) 
  
In the empirical assessment of alternative road pricing schemes, we include revenue allocation as a 
crucial feature, in line with the evidence from the literature of its influence in engendering support or 
otherwise for a road pricing scheme (Hensher and Li 2012). This is in addition to the description of a 
road pricing regime (for example, cordon or distance-based) and pricing levels for existing (for 
example, fuel, registration) and new charges. We speculate that the weighting parameter γ is likely to 
be different for the revenue allocation plan compared to the actual pricing scheme. 
To complete the functional specification, we define a risk parameter α which reflects the presence of 
risk aversion, risk taking and risk neutrality, depending on its empirical value, for accommodating 
risky decision making with respect to the road pricing schemes being assessed. The pricing levels 
associated with the new cordon or distance-based charges is represented as a constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA) model form defined by a general power specification (that is, 1 /(1 )U x α α−= − ) (see 
Andersen et al. 2012; Holt and Laury 2002). 
The attribute-specific representation in the utility expressions associated with each alternative road 
pricing scheme in the voting choice model is given in equation (2) where γ may empirically differ 
between the belief weight attached to the new pricing charges and the revenue allocation proposal. 
 
1 1{[ ( ( ) ) ( (1 ) ) ] /(1 )}rpcr rpcr Qi QiU W P Z rpcr W P Z rpcr
α αβ α− −= + − −  (2) 
  
Qi relates to beliefs in the context of the extent to which the charging scheme (i=1) will make the 
voter better (or worse) off; similarly for revenue allocation, Qi (i=2) relates to beliefs in the context of 
whether the proposed allocation of revenue will be perceived to make the voter better (or worse) off. 
There are also a number of other variables in the utility expression that are not specified this way, and 
are added in as linear in parameters. The presence of α and γ  results in an embedded attribute-specific 
treatment in the overall utility expression associated with each alternative that is non-linear in a 
number of parameters.  Only if (1 )α−  = 1, and γ =1 does equation (2) collapse to a linear utility 
function. We implement this framework with new data, including a stated choice experiment. Before 
doing so we set out the full likelihood function that accommodates the non-linear parameter form for 
the voter choice model.  
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3. A mixed multinomial logit model with non-linear utility 
functions 
A mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) model with non-linear utility functions is used to obtain 
parameter estimates for the voter choice model.  The general form departs from a standard linear-in-
parameters random utility model with utility functions defined over Jit choices available to individual i 
in choice situation t, and alternative m: 
 
W(i,t,m)  =  U(i,t,m)  +  εitm, m = 1,..., Jit ; t = 1,...,Ti; i = 1,...,N  (3) 
  
with the IID, type I extreme value distribution assumed for the random terms εitm.  Conditioned on 
U(i,t,m), the choice probabilities take the familiar multinomial logit form (equation 4).  
Prob(i,t,j) =  
1
exp[ ( , , )] .
exp[ ( , , )]itJm
U i t j
U i t m=Σ
   (4) 
  
The utility functions that accommodate non-linearity in the unknown parameters, even where the 
parameters are non-random, are built up from an extension of the MMNL structure, along similar 
lines to Anderson et al. (2012) but with extensions to incorporate scale heterogeneity: 
 
U(i,t,m)  =  σi [Vm(xitm,βi,wi)], (5.1) 
  
Vm(xitm,βi,wi)  =  hm(xitm,βi)  +  1Kk=Σ dkm θkwik, (5.2) 
  
βi  =  β  +  Γvi, (5.3) 
  
The various parts allow several degrees of flexibility.  In (5.2), the function hm(..) is an arbitrary non-
linear function that defines the underlying utilities (preferences) across alternatives.  It is within hm(..) 
that we embed the attribute-specific belief weights and risk attitudes for the road pricing schemes. 
1
K
k=Σ dkm θkwik are the error components where the wik are normally distributed effects with zero 
mean, i = 1,…,M < J and ckm = 1 if m appears in utility function j, and θk is the standard deviation 
parameter. 
Heterogeneity in the preference parameters of the model is shown in (5.3), where βi varies around the 
overall constant β in response to unobservable heterogeneity in vi.  The parameters of the distribution 
of βi are the overall mean (that is, β) and the Cholesky square root (lower triangle) of the covariance 
matrix of the random components, Γ. The random components are assumed to have known, fixed 
(usually at zero) means, constant known variances (usually one), and to be uncorrelated. In the most 
common applications, multivariate standard normality would be assumed for vi.  The covariance 
matrix of βi would then be Ω = ΓΓ′.  Parameters that are not random are included in the general form 
of the model, by imposing rows of zeros in Γ including the diagonal elements.  A non-random 
parameters model would have Γ = 0 in entirety. 
Parameters of the model are estimated by maximum simulated likelihood.  The log likelihood function 
based on equations (3)-(5) is given in (6) 
 
1 1
log ( , , | , , , ) log ( , , | , )i
TN
i ii t
L P i t j
= =
=∑ ∏X y w v w vβ Γ θ . (6) 
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The conditioning is on the unobservables w,v and the observables, Xi, yi where Xi is the full data set 
of attributes and characteristics, xi,t,m, and yi is a full set of binary indicators, yitm that marks which 
alternative is chosen, yitj = 1, and which are not, yitm = 0, in each choice situation.  In full, 
1
1
exp[ ( , , )]Pr ( , , ) .
exp[ ( , , )]
itq
it
it
y
J
Jq
m
U i t job i t j
U i t m= =
 
=  
Σ 
∏  (7) 
 
To estimate the model parameters, it is necessary to obtain the log likelihood unconditioned on the 
unobservable elements. The unconditional log likelihood is  
 
[ ]1 1,log ( , , | , ) log ( , , | , ) ( , ) .
i
i i
TN
i i i i i ii t
L P i t j f d d
= =
= ×∑ ∏∫w vX y w v w v w vβ Γ θ  (8) 
  
Since the integrals do not exist in closed form, they are approximated, using simulation.  The 
simulated log likelihood function is 
 
1 1 1
1log ( , , | , ) log [ , , | ( ), ( )]i
TN R
S i ii r t
L P i t j r r
R= = =
=∑ ∑ ∏X y w vβ Γ θ  (9) 
  
where P[i,t,j|wi(r),vi(r)] is computed from (4) and (5.1)-(7) using R simulated draws, wi(r), vi(r) from 
the assumed populations.  For optimization, the derivatives of the simulated log likelihood function 
must be simulated as well (see Hensher et al. 2011 for details).   
4. The road pricing data collection approach 
The survey instrument was an online computer assisted personal interview (CAPI) accessed via 
laptops used by interviewers who sat with the respondents to provide any advice that was required in 
working through the survey, while not offering answers to any of the questions. The two key elements 
of the survey are the belief questions and the voter choice experiment. The belief question was linked 
to each of the alternatives (excluding the status quo alternative) presented in the choice games, and 
was asked prior to the choice games.  
The choice experiment consisted of three alternatives; two labelled alternatives representing a cordon-
based charging scheme and a distance-based charging scheme, randomly assigned to road pricing 
schemes 1 and 2 (see Figure 1), and the status quo. Each alternative was described by attributes 
representing the average amount of tolls and fuel outlaid weekly, the annual vehicle registration 
charge and the allocation of          revenues raised to improve public transport, improve and expand 
upon the existing road network, to reduce income tax, to contribute to general government revenue 
and to be used to compensate toll road companies for loss of toll revenue. The cordon-based charging 
scheme and a distance-based alternative were also described by either a peak and off peak cordon-
based charging amount or a peak or off peak per kilometre distance-based charge. Both non-status 
quo alternatives were also described by the year proposed that the scheme would commence. 
A Bayesian D-efficient experimental design was implemented for the study. The design was 
generated in such a way that the cost related attribute levels for the status quo were first acquired from 
respondents during preliminary questions in the survey, whilst associated attributes for the cordon-
based and distance-based charging schemes were pivoted off of these as minus percentage shifts 
representing a reduction in such costs for these schemes. Pivoted attributes included average fuel costs 
and annual registration fees. Fuel costs were reduced by anywhere between zero per cent and 50 per 
cent of the respondent reported values, either representing no reduction in fuel tax or up to a potential 
100 per cent reduction in fuel taxes. Registration fees were reduced to between zero per cent and 100 
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per cent from the respondent-reported values (see Rose et al. 2008 for a description of pivot type 
designs). Toll was only included in the status quo alternative, being set to zero for the non status quo 
alternatives since it is replaced by the road pricing regime.  
The allocation of revenues raised were fixed for the status quo alternative, but varied in the cordon-
based and distance-based charging schemes over choice tasks. The allocation of revenue was varied 
from zero per cent to 100 per cent for a given revenue stream category. Within a charging scheme, the 
allocation of revenue was such that the sum had to equal 100 per cent across all possible revenue 
allocations.  
The cordon-based charging alternative was also described by a peak and off peak cordon charge. The 
peak charge varied between $2.00 and $20.00, whilst the off peak charge was varied between $0.00 
and $15.00. Likewise, the distance-based charge was also described by two distance-based charging 
attributes, one for trips taken during peak periods and the second for off-peak trips. The per kilometre 
charge for the peak period ranged from $0.05 per kilometre to $0.40 per kilometre, whilst the off peak 
distance-based charge varied between $0.00 and $0.30 per kilometre. The ranges selected were based 
on ranges that we believe would contain the most likely levels if implemented. The design was 
generated in such a way that the peak cordon-based and peak per kilometre based charges were 
always equal to or greater than the associated off peak charges. Finally, the cordon-based and 
distance-based charging schemes were described by the year the scheme would be implemented.  In 
each case, this was varied between 2013 (representing one year from the survey) and 2016 
(representing a four year delay from the time of the survey). 
The attributes and the relevant attribute levels for all alternatives are shown in Table 1. Priors for the 
design were obtained from a pilot study consisting of 9 respondents collected prior to the main field 
phase. The final design consisted of 60 choice tasks which were blocked into 15 blocks of four choice 
tasks each. The blocking was accomplished by using an algorithm designed to minimise the maximum 
absolute correlation between the design attributes and the blocking column. 
Table 1:  The choice experiment attribute levels and range 
Attribute Status quo Cordon-based scheme Distance-based scheme 
Year scheme introduced - 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 
Average fuel per week User reported level 
0%, -10%, -20%,  
-30%, -40%, -50% 
0%, -10%, -20%,  
-30%, -40%, -50% 
Average toll per week User reported level $0.00 $0.00 
Annual vehicle registration User reported level 
0%, -25%, -50%,  
-75%, -100% 
0%, -25%, -50%,  
-75%, -100% 
Peak cordon-based charge (per trip) $0.00 $2.00, $6.50, $11.00,  $15.50, $20.00 - 
Off peak cordon-based charge (per trip) $0.00 $0.00, $3.00, $6.00,  $9.00, $12.00, $15.00 - 
Peak distance-based charge (per km) $0.00 - $0.05, $0.12, $0.19,  $0.26, $0.33, $0.40 
Off peak distance-based charge (per km) $0.00 - $0.00, $0.06, $0.12,  $0.18, $0.24, $0.30 
% of funds allocated to public transport 0% 0%, 20%, 40%,  60%, 80%, 100% 
0%, 20%, 40%,  
60%, 80%, 100% 
% of funds allocated to road infrastructure 30% 0%, 20%, 40%,  60%, 80%, 100% 
0%, 20%, 40%,  
60%, 80%, 100% 
% of funds allocated to reducing tax 0% 0%, 20%, 40%,  60%, 80%, 100% 
0%, 20%, 40%,  
60%, 80%, 100% 
% of funds allocated to general revenue 65% 0%, 20%, 40%,  60%, 80%, 100% 
0%, 20%, 40%,  
60%, 80%, 100% 
% of funds allocated to private (toll) firms 5% 0%, 20%, 40%,  60%, 80%, 100% 
0%, 20%, 40%,  
60%, 80%, 100% 
 
The final belief and choice screens are presented in Figures 1 and 2, with the boundaries of the 
proposed cordon-based charge area shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 1:  Illustrative belief screen 
 
 
Figure 2:  Illustrative voting choice screen 
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Figure 3:  The location of the Cordon-Charge Area 
 
Respondents had to be of voting age. The main survey of 200 residents was undertaken in April 2012 
in the Sydney Metropolitan Area. A descriptive profile of the data is given in Tables 2a and 2b. 
Interviews took, on average, 46.2 minutes but were as short as 12.37 minutes, and as long as 88.5 
minutes.  
Table 2a:  Descriptive profile of sample 
 
Status Quo Variables Mean Std deviation Min Max 
Total cost (per week) 66.86 45.76 0 261.5 
Fuel cost (per week) 46.12 34.99 0 200 
Tolls per week 7.67 14.63 0 100 
Vehicle Registration per annum 679.65 464.99 0 3200 
Alternative voted for if a referendum on road pricing (%) 19.6  0 1 
Alternative chosen as best for respondent (%) 20.3  0 1 
Alternative chosen is seen as best for the community (%) 16.8  0 1 
     
Cordon Road Pricing Scheme Variables Mean Std deviation Min Max 
Total cost (per week) 48.46 36.69 0 243.9 
Fuel cost (per week) 34.46 27.25 0 180 
Tolls per week 0 0 0 0 
Vehicle Registration per annum 339.9 377.38 0 3200 
Peak charge (7-9am, 4-6pm) $ per entry 11.05 6.37 2 20 
Off peak charge $ per entry 5.83 4.50 0 15 
Cordon charges per week 7.47 17.05 0 132 
Peak period weekly cordon cost outlay 3.58 9.75 0 83.5 
Off peak period weekly cordon cost outlay 3.89 9.58 0 84.1 
Alternative voted for if a referendum on road pricing (%) 49.6  0 1 
Alternative chosen as best for respondent (%) 50.6  0 1 
Alternative chosen is seen as best for the community (%) 49.5  0 1 
Road pricing scheme is acceptable (%) 76.4  0 1 
Revenue allocated to public transport (%) 21.2 27.5 0 100 
Revenue allocated to existing and construct roads (%) 18.4 26.5 0 100 
Revenue allocated to reduce personal income tax (%) 20.9 26.3 0 100 
Revenue allocated to private toll road company (%) 18.9 29.2 0 100 
Revenue allocated to general govt revenue (%) 20.7 27.6 0 100 
Belief that the road pricing scheme will:     
    Make you better off  0.62 0.33 0 1 
    Be fair for the community  0.24 0.33 0 1 
    Effective in reducing traffic congestion 0.27 0.33 0 1 
     
Distance-Based Road Pricing Scheme Variables Mean Std deviation Min Max 
Total cost (per week) 71.01 58.44 0 446 
Fuel cost (per week) 34.62 28.65 0 200 
Understanding buy in for risky prospects:  Incorporating degree of belief into the  ex anti assessment of 
support for alternative road pricing schemes 
Hensher, Rose and Collins 
 
9 
Tolls per week 0 0 0 0 
Vehicle Registration per annum 342.4 374.2 0 3200 
Peak charge (7-9am, 4-6pm) $ per week given weekly kilometres 15.12 22.01 0 160 
Off peak charge $ per week given weekly kilometres 14.68 25.26 0 234 
Peak period Distance-based cost per km ($/km) 0.225 0.120 0.05 0.40 
Off peak period Distance-based cost per km ($/km) 0.101 0.097 0 0.3 
Alternative voted for if a referendum on road pricing (%) 30.6  0 1 
Alternative chosen as best for respondent (%) 29.1  0 1 
Alternative chosen is seen as best for the community (%) 33.6  0 1 
Road pricing scheme is acceptable (%) 55.9    
Revenue allocated to public transport (%) 21.1 30.5 0 100 
Revenue allocated to existing and construct roads (%) 18.6 27.2 0 100 
Revenue allocated to reduce personal income tax (%) 22.5 28.4 0 100 
Revenue allocated to private toll road company (%) 20.5 26.9 0 100 
Revenue allocated to general govt revenue (%) 17.3 26.48 0 100 
Belief that the road pricing scheme will:     
    Make you better off  0.49 0.349 0 1 
    Be fair for the community  0.21 0.314 0 1 
    Effective in reducing traffic congestion 0.27 0.334 0 1 
 
Table 2b:  Descriptive profile of sample 
 
Other Descriptive Data: Mean Std deviation Min Max 
Peak kilometres per week 70.68 88.58 0 400 
Off Peak kilometres per week 145.9 143.6 0 977.5 
Proportion of weekly kilometres in peak 0.297 0.269 0 0.99 
Weekly hours travelling by car and motorbike 7.60 6.68 0 50 
Weekly CBD trips 1.85 3.48 0 18 
Preferred revenue allocated to public transport (%) 38.86 18.50 0 100 
Preferred revenue to existing and construct roads (%) 32.03 14.44 0 70 
Preferred revenue to reduce personal income tax (%) 16.06 16.83 0 100 
Preferred revenue to private toll road company (%) 6.20 8.11 0 50 
Preferred revenue to general govt revenue (%) 6.86 8.41 0 30 
Extent of awareness of what road pricing means (%) 38.03 29.24 0 100 
How familiar are you with the debate on road pricing (%) 22.63 27.09 0 100 
Confidence in public sector allocating revenue as you indicated (%) 22.32  0 100 
Would support a road pricing trial (%) 91.8  0 100 
Cents per km to switch from peak travel if price selected (84% 
sample) 
9.06 5.02 2 15 
Amount spent per week on fuel ($) 46.12 34.98 0 200 
Amount spent per week on tolls ($) 7.67 14.63 0 100 
Amount spent per week on public transport fares ($) 13.02 25.70 0 96 
Annual vehicle registration excl insurances ($) 679.6 464.8 0 3200 
Percentage of fuel and toll costs paid by respondent (%) 84.6  0 100 
Percentage of fuel and toll costs paid by business respondent owns 
(%) 
3.53  0 100 
Percentage of fuel and toll costs paid by another business (%) 8.88  0 100 
Number of privately registered cars in household 1.85 1.01 0 5 
Number of household business registered cars in household 0.19 0.83 0 9 
Number of other business registered cars in household 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Age of respondent 50.6 14.2 30 70 
Annual personal gross income 74,225 53,167 10,000 250,000 
Male 35.6  0 1 
No. of people in household 17 year plus 2.79 1.13 1 7 
No. of people in household 11-17 old 0.24 0.58 0 3 
No. of people in household under 11 years old 0.31 0.71 0 4 
No. of people in household  who hold a valid driver’s licence 2.53 1.06 0 4 
Survey interview time (mins) 46.2 12.37 11.4 88.5 
 
The average weekly cost for the status quo is $66.86 (standard deviation of $45.76 and a maximum of 
$261.5); in contrast the average associated with road price (RP) scheme 1 is $60.60 (standard 
deviation of $49.86 and maximum of $446.1), and for road price scheme 2 it is $58.87 (standard 
deviation of $50.28 and maximum of $415.7). When we difference each of the schemes against the 
status quo (see Figure 4), for RP scheme 1 we have an average of $6.26 in favour of the status quo 
(with a standard deviation of $32.5 and range from -$208.5 to $133.7), and for RP scheme 2, we have 
a mean difference of $7.99 in favour of the status quo, with a standard deviation of $32.53 and range 
from -$178.2 to $166.7. This indicates that the randomisation of the two RP schemes between the two 
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non status quo alternatives has resulted in similar profiles of each alternative across the sample, as 
expected. 
 
 
Figure 4:  Difference in weekly cost outlay: Status quo minus road pricing scheme 
Another way of presenting the RP schemes is to distinguish a cordon-based (CB) and a distance-based 
(DB) charging scheme. The CB schemes average $48.46 per week; in contrast the DB schemes 
average $71.0 per week. The latter is close to the mean status quo cost of $66.86, whereas the CB 
proposals have a significantly lower weekly cost, clearly due to reduced fuel and registration charges 
and no metropolitan wide tolls. 
Over the range of RP schemes investigated, we see a marked support over the status quo situation, 
with only 19.6 per cent of the sample across 4 choice sets per respondent, voting for maintaining the 
status quo. Thus, over 80 per cent of the time, the sample would vote for a new road pricing scheme. 
This is impressive and does suggest that there is some support for pricing reform where changes are 
also made in fuel (reducing for a mean of $46.12 to $34.6), registration (reducing from a mean of 
$680 per year to $340 per annum), and toll costs (reducing for a mean of $7.67 per week to zero) as 
part of pricing reform package.  
When we consider the extent to which respondents believe that they will better off under a specific RP 
scheme, 61.8 per cent believe they will be better off under a proposed cordon-based reform initiative 
while 49.5 per cent believe they will be better off under a proposed distance-based scheme. This is 
encouraging evidence and the contrast of these two percentages lines up well with the average weekly 
costs associated with the two schemes of $48.46 and $71.01 respectively. Clearly the ex ante support 
must be determined in the context of a very specific RP scheme, which we undertake as a set of 
simulated scenarios once the voting choice model is estimated. Whether this ex ante evidence will 
translate ex post into support for road pricing if a referendum was held is unknown. 
The distribution of revenues generated from congestion charging is the key to political support, as 
Goodwin (1997) claimed: “discussion of road pricing without explicit attention to the use of revenue 
streams is inherently unlikely to be able to command a consensus in its support”. With regard to 
revenue distribution strategies, Small (1992) suggested that a package of travel allowances, tax 
reductions, and improved public transport be introduced as part of the buy in plan. Goodwin (1989) 
proposed a combination of road improvements, public transport improvements, and the general fund 
of the city or state. The evidence from this study is that the sample supports 38.9 per cent of revenue 
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raised being allocated to public transport improvements, 32.0 per cent to improving existing roads and 
construction of new roads, 16.1 per cent to reducing personal income tax, and the balance of 
approximately 13 per cent to compensating toll road companies for loss of revenue and payments into 
government consolidated revenue. 
Two important features of the data are establishing the extent to which respondents are aware of what 
road pricing means and their familiarity with the road pricing debate. Indication was provided by 38.0 
per cent of respondents that they are aware of what road pricing means while 22.6 per cent expressed 
familiarity with the debate. In addition, over 91 per cent of respondents indicated that they would 
support a road pricing reform trial, and furthermore that it would only take, on average, a 9 cents per 
km peak charge to encourage significant switch in car travel out of the peak periods (7-9am and 4-
6pm weekdays). 
5. Voter choice models 
The voting choice models are summarised in Table 3. Both models allow for preference heterogeneity 
and risk attitude, the latter only included for the new distance or cordon-based charging components. 
Model 1 also includes the belief weights which condition the marginal utility or disutility weights 
attached to the new distance or cordon-based charging components and the revenue allocation 
categories. These models are non-linear in the risk attitude and belief functions (see equation 2). We 
investigated the potential role of awareness and familiarity but found that these influences were not 
statistically significant in the presence of the significant influences in Table 3. Notably, there was a 
strong correlation between belief, awareness and familiarity which may explain this non-significance. 
Table 3:  Summary of voting choice models 800 observations (200 respondents)  
Attributes Model 1  
(Embedded Belief) 
Model 2  
(No Account for 
Beliefs) 
 Parameter t-ratio Parameter  t-ratio 
Mean of random parameters:     
Current cost elements (fuel, registration, tolls) (per week) -0.0412 -4.31 -0.05534 -5.42 
New distance or cordon-based charging (per week) -0.0969 -3.04 -0.2258 -6.24 
Per cent of revenue allocated to:     
Improving public transport  0.0619 7.24 0.0222 5.52 
Improving existing and construct new roads 0.0376 6.11 0.0142 3.71 
Reducing personal income tax 0.0472 6.40 0.0152 4.23 
Standard deviation or spread of random parameters:     
Current cost elements (fuel, registration, tolls) (per week) (t,2) 0.0824 4.31 0.1107 5.42 
New distance or cordon-based charging (per week) (lognormal) 0.2027 4.00 0.1991 4.87 
Improving public transport (lognormal) 0.0403 3.03 0.0220 3.00 
Improving existing and construct new roads(lognormal) 0.0233 1.81 0.0191 2.15 
Reducing personal income tax(lognormal) 0.0385 2.95 0.0136 1.51 
Non-random parameters:     
Alpha (risk attitude) 0.2749 1.68 0.6649 13.2 
Gamma for new distance or cordon-based charging (belief 
conditioning) 
0.5268 2.11 - - 
Gamma for revenue allocation (belief conditioning) 1.5646 4.13 - - 
Status quo constant -0.7848 -1.01 -2.2188 -2.36 
Male (1,0) 1.0318 1.60 1.3288 1.77 
Annual personal income (‘000s) -0.0117 -1.81 -0.0112 -1.51 
Total one-way trips per week -0.0533 -2.31 -0.0539 -2.08 
Error Component:     
Sigma (non status quo alternatives) 2.9510 5.91 3.4003 6.19 
Model Fit:   
Log-likelihood (0) -878.89 -878.89 
Log-likelihood at convergence -568.58 -623.04 
Adjusted pseudo R2 0.353 0.291 
AIC (sample adjusted) 1.456 1.593 
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The overall goodness of fit of the model with embedded belief is significantly better than the model 
that ignores the role of belief. All parameter estimates are significant at the 10 per cent or better level 
of statistical confidence, with the majority of parameters being significant at well above the 5 per cent 
confidence level. 
The difference in the probability weighting parameter, γ, which measures the degree of curvature of 
the belief weighting function in Model 1 associated with belief conditioning for the new charging 
level and the revenue allocation is an important finding, suggesting that as gamma approaches 1, the 
function is linear in the belief probability weighting. A gamma less than 1 in the positive domain will 
tend to lead to greater divergence at the extreme range of the probability distribution between the 
reported belief probability and the perceptual conditioned belief probability, in contrast to situations 
where gamma exceeds 1.0.  
The mean response on the subjective belief scale is 0.56, with a standard deviation of 0.34, and a 
skewness of -0.25. The perceptually conditioned belief weight distribution has a mean of 0.30 
(standard deviation of 0.30 and skewness of 0.69) related to the new distance and cordon-based 
charging levels, and 0.35 (standard deviation of 0.39 and skewness of 0.55) for revenue allocation. 
Given the two estimated parameters for gamma related to the new distance and cordon-based charging 
levels and the revenue allocation plan, the resulting belief weights have been obtained using the 
functional form from Tversky and Kahneman (1974), given in equation 2. A plot of the reported 
subjective belief response probability against the perceptually conditioned belief weights is given in 
Figure 5. The findings are similar to what are reported in the many prospect theory studies in respect 
of decisions weights.   
 
 
Figure 5:  Belief weights and perceptual conditioning 
 
At low levels of subjective belief probability, up to 0.3, we find that the perceptual conditioned belief 
probability is higher for the belief function associated with the new classes of charging; however, as 
we move beyond 0.3, the perceptually conditioned belief probability is lower than the subjective 
response. This suggests that there is a tendency to under-estimate the belief probability at low levels 
of subjective belief probabilities (up to 0.3) and to over-estimate the subjective belief response at 
higher levels of probability (over 0.3) with the greatest gap at around 0.9. Likewise, when considering 
the belief weights associated with revenue allocation, there is a tendency to over-estimate the 
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subjective response belief probabilities up to 0.7 with a negligible difference (albeit marginally under-
estimated) over 0.7.  
It is clear from this evidence that perceptual conditioning does matter, especially at the very low and 
very high probabilities, suggesting that perceptual conditioning moves the belief probabilities towards 
0.5 in comparison to what is reported. That is, the extremes of the subjective belief distribution are 
suppressed as a result of perceptual conditioning for the new distance and cordon-based charging 
levels. For revenue allocation, the opposite occurs with perceptual conditioning tending to downscale 
the subjective belief response probabilities throughout the entire distribution, up to 0.7, and no effect 
beyond 0.7. 
The belief weighting function is a transformation of a stated degree of belief, and as such there is the 
potential risk of endogeneity bias (EB). EB can arise from a number of sources such as measurement 
error, missing attributes and simultaneity and is observed when a specific variable included in the 
observed effects is correlated with the error term associated with the utility expression containing the 
explanatory variable of interest. To ensure that the belief weighting function is purged of its 
endogeneity bias (that is, the part that is correlated with the random error component), we undertook 
two tasks: first we tested the extent to which the belief weight has systematic influence on the 
standard deviation of the error component, and secondly we identified other exogenous variables that 
are correlated with the belief weight, but not with the error component that could be used as 
instrumental variables, or simply as evidence of no endogeneity bias. An important finding is that the 
belief weight transform purges the correlation compared to the use of the stated belief response, 
effectively eliminating the possibility of endogeneity bias. We included the belief weights in the error 
component decomposition and found that they had t-values of -0.04 and -0.18 respectively for the new 
charges and the revenue allocation belief functions, which suggests that the belief weights have no 
correlated influence on the error components; hence we conclude that there is no statistically observed 
evidence of endogeneity bias. 
As expected, there is a greater variance in the unobserved effects associated with the road pricing 
scheme alternatives, captured by the statistically significant sigma parameter for the error component 
associated with the two road pricing alternatives. This is a plausible finding, suggesting that there is 
greater unobserved heterogeneity within the voting population, as represented by the sample, in 
respect of the role of unobserved influences on the probability of voting for the road pricing schemes 
in comparison to voting to stay with the status quo. 
The inferred mean direct elasticities of probability of voting for a road pricing scheme with respect to 
a specific attribute associated with a proposed road pricing scheme are summarised in Table 4. The 
most revealing finding is that when account is taken of the belief that respondents have in the extent 
to which a road pricing scheme will make them better or worse off, and after the subjective belief 
response data on the 0-100 scale is adjusted for perceptual conditioning, that the mean estimate of the 
impact of a percentage change in the charge is considerably smaller than would be the case if beliefs 
are not accounted for. For the way that the raised revenue is allocated, the mean estimate of the 
impact of a percentage change in revenue allocation is lower when beliefs are accounted for, but the 
difference is quite small. 
Table 4:  Mean direct elasticities of probability of voting choice 
Attribute of Road Pricing Scheme Model 1 
Embedded 
Belief 
Model 2 
(No Account 
for Beliefs) 
Current cost elements (fuel, registration, tolls) (per week) -0.463 -0.662 
New distance or cordon-based charging (per week) -0.062 -0.273 
Improving public transport  0.156 0.139 
Improving existing and construct new roads 0.107 0.092 
Reducing personal income tax 0.135 0.116 
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To illustrate the likelihood of a vote in a referendum for a specific road pricing scheme, we have 
selected a number of schemes that might represent the range of options under consideration by 
government. Model 1 with embedded belief is applied to the sample, using a simulator that allows for 
random parameters and all non-linearity in belief and risk attitude. These are summarised in Table 5 
together with the predicted proportion of the population that would vote for the scheme based on the 
sample being representative of the voting population. 
Table 5:  Predicted support for a road pricing scheme under a referendum: Illustrative scenarios 
Attribute of Road 
Pricing Scheme 
RP Scheme  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Current cost elements 
(fuel) $/km  
SQ SQ SQ 0.5SQ SQ SQ SQ 0.5SQ 0.5SQ 0.75SQ SQ SQ SQ 
Current cost elements 
(registration)  per 
annum 
SQ SQ SQ SQ SQ SQ SQ 0.5SQ 0.5SQ 0.75SQ SQ SQ SQ 
New distance based 
charging ($/km) - peak 
- - - - 5 5 5 - 8 5 3 0 0 
New distance based 
charging ($/km) off 
peak 
- - - - 0 0 0 - 3 3 0 0 0 
New cordon-based 
charging ($/day) - 
peak 
10 20 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 8 
New cordon-based 
charging ($/day) – off 
peak 
5 5 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 
Improving public 
transport revenue 
allocation (%) 
0 0 0 0 0 50 100 0 100 100 100 100 0 
Improving existing 
and construct new 
roads revenue 
allocation (%) 
0 0 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Reducing personal 
income tax revenue 
allocation (%) 
0 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Predicted Voting 
Support 
47.7 46.6 45.1 58.1 17.6 25.5 27.2 79.1 9.5 10.3 32.2 62.4 48.9 
 
The findings show clearly that a cordon-based charge in the CBD is a sensible initial scheme to 
introduce, since it is predicted ex ante to obtain more than 50 per cent (that is, 62.4 per cent) vote 
when the daily peak entry charge is $8 and the off peak charge is $3, and 100 per cent of funds are 
allocated to public transport improvements (RP scheme 12). This reduces to 60.9 per cent when the 
revenue is allocated 50:50 to public transport and road improvements (RP scheme 13). Distance-based 
charging (RP schemes 5-7, 9-11) is clearly less popular, with the highest percentage voting for a 
scheme in the examples in Table 5 being 32.2 per cent. A particularly important finding is that when 
the revenue allocation is recognised in conjunction with distance-based charging, the support 
increases from 17.6 per cent to between 25.5 and 27.1 per cent (depending on the revenue allocation 
plan). The evidence reinforces the view in the growing literature that how the revenue is allocated is 
critical in obtaining buy in to road pricing proposals (see Hensher and Li 2012). What we have been 
able to do for the first time is identify the very specific role of revenue allocation in influencing, ex 
ante, the voting intentions of the population. 
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6. Conclusions 
The substantive empirical findings offer new evidence on the ex ante probability of voting for a range 
of road pricing schemes, accounting for the regime (that is, cordon or distance based), the charge level 
(fixed per time of entry or cents per km by peak and off peak times), and how the revenue raised is 
allocated. There exists, to varying degrees, ex ante support (or buy in) for specific road pricing 
schemes if they were subject to a referendum vote. It is clear that how the revenue is allocated has a 
significant influence on the level of support, and that introducing a cordon-based charging scheme in 
the CBD that has different fixed charges for the peak and off peak is a wise transitional strategy to a 
full roll out in the future of a metropolitan wide distance-based charging scheme. 
This paper also promotes a view that subjective beliefs about the extent to which a road 
pricing scheme will make someone better or worse off should, after perceptual conditioning, 
be included in a voting choice model, as a way of recognising the role of belief in voting 
outcomes.  The evidence herein highlights the important role of belief, and in particular how 
its influence increases the support for voting for a road pricing scheme compared to ignoring 
such relevant information. 
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